Don’t you know? The moon landing was faked! The Earth is flat! Jet engine fuel can’t get hot enough to melt steel beams…
Too many people believe these things we call conspiracy theories. Ridiculous as it might sound, many people actually believe these kinds of things. But why is that the case? What actually makes someone believe, or become more inclined to believe a conspiracy theory? And what repercussions do these beliefs have?
One common explanation for belief in these theories is their underlying emotions/predispositions towards events. The most commonly attributed emotion is surprisingly anxiety, of all emotions. More widespread feelings of anxiety have been shown to have a correlation with increased belief in conspiracy theories (Moyer, 2019). These anxious predispositions towards events can change your attribution of them. Instead of taking a more reasonable explanation, your mind can drift towards more exaggerated explanations, seen in the wacky conspiracy theories we see today. Feelings of alienation and powerlessness have also shown to have these kinds of effects (Uscinski et al, 2016).
Another factor that could influence you is a sense of wrongdoing. Conspiracy theories tend to rise up more when people feel wronged in some way, and need an explanation (Imhoff and Bruder, 2014). When Joe Biden won the presidential election in 2020, many people who wanted Donald Trump to win accused the elections of being rigged. A study conducted in 2018 found that about 60% of Americans believed that JFK, a widely loved president, was assassinated by the CIA (Douglas et al, 2019). The terror attacks on 9/11 sprung up a variety of conspiracy theories. These examples have an interesting theme- not that they were American, but that a large group of people felt wronged.
Many conspiracy theories are derived from whoever could be on the opposite end of the wrongdoing. This means that they are typically aimed at those with power, or the rich and/or powerful (Imhoff, 2025). Since the “powerful” are limited in number, the theories often find themselves circulating among the proletariat. Some theories can gain traction quickly (especially through social media), and influence real-world activities. In history, this ire manifested itself in witch hunts and revolutions. In modern times, it can show up in struggles for power, especially with politicians and leaders. A prevalent example is the riot that happened on January 6th, 2021 on the white house in response to the presidential elections, as in figure 1. It has also seen itself in a growing anti-vaccination movement since COVID-19 tore through the world, among other nonscientific sentiments.

Figure 1: An image showing the scale of the Capitol raid. Source: Tayfun Coskun/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
In conclusion, people tend to believe conspiracy theories through their reaction to events that they were disturbed by. Understanding these conspiracies is also important, as they can eventually burst into events like the US capitol raid. It’s especially important to scientists, as science itself can also be doubted by conspiracies. But before you judge conspiracy theorists on their outlandish ideas, just remember that a broken clock is right twice a day.
References
Douglas, K.M., Uscinski, J.E., Sutton, R.M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C.S. and Deravi, F. “Understanding Conspiracy Theories.” Political Psychology, 40 (2019): 3-35. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12568
Imhoff, Roland. “The Psychology of Conspiracy Mentality”. PsyArXiv, (2025). https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/e4sn7_v1.
Imhoff, R., & Bruder, M. “Speaking (Un–)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as A Generalised Political Attitude.” European Journal of Personality, 28 (2014): 25-43. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.1930
Moyer, Melinda Wenner. “WHY WE BELIEVE CONSPIRACY THEORIES.” Scientific American 320, no. 3 (2019): 58–63. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27265112.
Uscinski, Joseph E., Casey Klofstad, and Matthew D. Atkinson. “What Drives Conspiratorial Beliefs? The Role of Informational Cues and Predispositions.” Political Research Quarterly , 69, no. 1 (2016): 57–71. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44018529.
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